DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 224 052 CS 503 945

AUTHOR Johnson, J. David; Tims, Albert R.
TITLE The Role of Mass Media Elites in Attitude Formation in Mexico.
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 46p.; Paper presented at the Meeting of the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research (Chicago, IL, 1980).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Advantaged; Attitude Change; Attitude Measures; *Communication (Thought Transfer); Foreign Countries; *Mass Media Effects; Media Research; *Mexicans; *Models; Research Methodology; Social Status; *Theories; Upper Class
IDENTIFIERS *Media Use

ABSTRACT

The dependency model of mass media effects predicts that dependency on media information increases as the level of societal structural conflict and change increase, resulting in greater mass media influence. However, this model appears to ignore the structural constraints that a nation's political system can have on media even before they deliver a message. Because the model may not fit Mexico's oligarchical power structure well, a study tested several dependency model hypotheses relating the perspectives of population elites in Mexico to the perspective of mass media. Two separate surveys in 1976 and 1979 provided data from which five different groups of subjects were defined: 100 mass media elites, 700 occupational elites, 411 upper SES (socioeconomic status) in 1976, 200 upper SES in 1979, and 500 Mexico City general public. A common set of items assessing Mexico's shared economic interests with 10 different partners was used in each survey. Analysis of the data indicated that the strongest economic identification was with the Latin American oil exporting countries, particularly for upper SES and occupational elites. Further analysis aimed at revealing how the various groups structure their views suggested that perceptions of Mexico's ties may be characterized by a set of underlying assumptions; still differences in the structure of perceptions did exist. These results suggest that current dependency models need to be modified to reflect other recurring and habitual channels of communication. (Definitions of items used in the study are appended.) (JL)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED224052

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA ELITES IN ATTITUDE FORMATION IN MEXICO

J. DAVID JOHNSON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE
MILWAUKEE, WISC. 53201

ALBERT R. TIMS
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON
MADISON, WISC. 53706

Paper presented to the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research Annual Convention, Chicago, Ill., 1980.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

J. David Johnson
Albert R. Tims

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

CS503905

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA ELITES IN ATTITUDE FORMATION IN MEXICO

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur's (1976) dependency model is an attempt to specify the conditions under which the mass media will produce cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects within a larger society. Thus, their theory represents an attempt to specify the unique role of media in attitude formation in a larger society. While they argue that their model is a general one applicable to all societies, it generally assumes a functionally distinct role for the mass media that may be more typical of Western societies than of developing countries. In this paper, we will examine the dependency model, focusing on cognitive effects in Mexico to determine how well it can be generalized to other societies. Specifically, we will identify the degree of correspondence between attitude structures concerning shared interests with other countries for samples of mass media elites, other elites, the urban upper SES, and the general populace in the time period from 1976 to 1979, a time of considerable change in Mexico's position in the world economy due to the discovery of large oil reserves.

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) specify two conditions necessary for media to have cognitive effects. First, cognitive effects are determined by the dependency of members of a society on media information sources to fulfill needs (e.g., understanding their social world and provision of information needed to act effectively in that world). The greater the audience's needs, the greater the influence of the media on audience cognitions. The second crucial condition, given a developed media system, is a high degree of change and conflict in the society. Dependency on media information increases as the level of societal structural conflict and change increases, resulting in greater mass media influence.

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA ELITES IN ATTITUDE FORMATION IN MEXICO

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur's (1976) dependency model is an attempt to specify the conditions under which the mass media will produce cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects within a larger society. Thus, their theory represents an attempt to specify the unique role of media in attitude formation in a larger society. While they argue that their model is a general one applicable to all societies, it generally assumes a functionally distinct role for the mass media that may be more typical of Western societies than of developing countries. In this paper, we will examine the dependency model, focusing on cognitive effects in Mexico to determine how well it can be generalized to other societies. Specifically, we will identify the degree of correspondence between attitude structures concerning shared interests with other countries for samples of mass media elites, other elites, the urban upper SES, and the general populace in the time period from 1976 to 1979, a time of considerable change in Mexico's position in the world economy due to the discovery of large oil reserves.

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) specify two conditions necessary for media to have cognitive effects. First, cognitive effects are determined by the dependency of members of a society on media information sources to fulfill needs (e.g., understanding their social world and provision of information needed to act effectively in that world). The greater the audience's needs, the greater the influence of the media on audience cognitions. The second crucial condition, given a developed media system, is a high degree of change and conflict in the society. Dependency on media information increases as the level of societal structural conflict and change increases, resulting in greater mass media influence.

A number of possible cognitive effects of the media are discussed by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976). One is the construction of social reality inherent in the media's creation and resolution of uncertainty. By controlling what information is presented and how it is presented, the media can limit the range of audience interpretations. They also argue that media can expand the belief systems of audience members by their presentation of aspects of the changing global environment that are beyond the direct apprehension of members of any one particular society. Thus, in developing countries, media can act to modify traditional perspectives of the world by providing dissonant information that requires the reordering of traditional viewpoints.

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) argue that agenda setting is only one of the possible cognitive effects of the media. In this framework, agenda setting is viewed in an information processing context whereby the media act to reduce uncertainty in audience members and to aid in their information processing by identifying more limited sets of topics and issues about which to concern themselves. They resolve the differences in aggregate versus personal agendas which has been a problem in agenda setting research (Becker, McCombs, and McLeod, 1975) by arguing that specific individuals will set their personal agendas in relation to their unique backgrounds. However, within a society, they argue, these backgrounds are shared by a number of members in broad strata representing societal stratification into elite groups and middle classes, for example. Thus, they speculate that within these strata, individuals will share a common agenda. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976), in contrast to other more traditional approaches (see Becker , et. al, 1975), see agenda setting as an interactional or reciprocal process where information is filtered through mass media systems and then selectively dissemenated. Audience members then filter this information based on

individual differences and their societal position; the results of this processing can in turn affect the media's agenda.

Extending The Dependency Model To Mexico

In this study, we will examine cognitions of various groupings in Mexico in 1976 and 1979. This period was particularly important for Mexican society and was characterized by dramatic changes in their position in the world. This change is largely attributable to the growing realization throughout the world of the importance of Mexico's oil reserves. During this time period, Mexico appears to have shifted its perspective from its traditional cultural ties with the rest of Latin America and global political ties with the third world to increased perceptions of shared interests with other oil producers and to using oil as a means of financing industrial development along a first world model, which brings Mexico more closely to the interests of the U.S., Japan, and the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) (Flanigan, 1979).

Mexico is also faced with a host of chronic social and economic ills that demand immediate attention, including: high levels of unemployment and underemployment, a rapidly expanding poor urban population, generally rapid population growth, and an unequitable distribution of wealth. All of these factors contribute to at least the potential for great social unrest in the near term unless serious reforms are rapidly introduced. These factors paint a picture of a country undergoing rapid change in its relationships with other countries and facing the prospect of increasing internal conflict.

The dependency model predicts that cognitive effects of the media will increase in countries facing these conditions. Mexico has a technically well developed and sophisticated media infrastructure. This is exemplified by its traditional leading role in Latin America, particularly in regard to film and

newspapers. While Mexico does have centralized information distributions, its media usage patterns and levels of interest in civic affairs are somewhat less than the industrialized West traditionally (Almond & Verba, 1963). This points to important modifications in the media-audience-social system interrelationship as explicated by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976). They assume that the media is the initiator of changes which the rest of society reacts to and that there is a relatively distinct role for the media in the larger society. More importantly, they appear to ignore the structural constraints that a nation's political system can have on the media before it even delivers a message.

Mexico's Political and Mass Media Systems

The dependency model appears to explain the role of the mass media in a compromise democracy such as the United States where there is a three-way flow of information between government, citizenry, and mass media. In such systems, the media act as a watch dog and neutral source of information for both the government and the people (Almond, 1960; Fagen, 1966).

Mexico has a somewhat unique political system that is difficult to fit into the traditional classificatory scheme for developing countries (Horowitz, 1966). Political decision-making in Mexico is confined to an oligarchical combination of elites who act in concert under the umbrella of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (P.R.I.) in a consensus building process to determine the future directions of the society (Horowitz, 1966). In an autocracy, or in one-party political states like Mexico, communication flows primarily among elites. There is little downward flow of communication to the rest of society or to the audience in dependency terms. In addition, the audience has little opportunity for feedback, especially from rural areas (Almond, 1960). The P.R.I. has proved a remarkably effective vehicle for maintaining the status quo in Mexico

by serving the needs of a number of powerful elites while maintaining a relatively stable society in the face of serious social problems. One of the effects of this olicharchical power structure has been a diminished sense of community responsibility and involvement on the part of large segments of society, particularly the lower and the middle classes (Almond & Verba, 1963).

The most interesting element of Mexico's political structure for this paper is the role of the P.R.I. and the government in controlling the mass media in Mexico. The dependency model does not describe what happens when a government actively exercises prior restraint on the media, but rather assumes that the government will react to what the media does. This ignores the interests of powerful political groupings within a society, especially groups oriented toward maintaining the status quo. Such governments, particularly during times of conflict and social change, recognize the importance of controlling the media. It has been noted that government constraints on the press increase in times of stress in the political system (Chaffee, 1975).

> Clearly the relationship of mass media institutions to political institutions is assumed in all states to have political consequences of major import and is never left to chance. All political systems must one way or another regulate the performance of media institutions in the political field. In part this is because the mass media, through their relations with the audience, have access to a potentially independent power base in society. (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1975, p. 169)

In Mexico this may not take the form of coercion and censorship typically thought of in the West as a major limitation on the functionally distinct role of the press, but rather the more subtle constraints of interelite influence which reflects the consensus building process within the larger Mexican society.

Constraints On The Mass Media In Mexico

Blumler and Gurevitch (1975) have isolated four factors that can specifically describe the level of constraints operating on the media in any given

society: media-political elite integration, degree of partisanship, state control, and the nature of the media's legitimizing creed. All of these factors affect the degree to which the media plays the functionally distinct and independent role assumed for them in a dependency model. When each one of these factors is examined, it becomes clear that the role of media institutions in Mexican society is considerably different than in Western societies, a factor which may considerably diminish their effects and may in turn cause members of a society to become dependent on other, nonmedia channels of information.

First, there is a high degree of media-political elite integration in Mexico. The most concrete example of this is the typical career path of Mexican political figures. When politicians reach the zenith of their political careers in government, they often transfer to media institutions. The most striking examples of this are the case of two past presidents of Mexico: Migail Alemán now runs a television network and Luis Echeverría owns a chain of newspapers (Pierce, 1979).

Second, the mass media in Mexico exhibit a high degree of partisanship. In Western societies, highly partisan media (e.g., those in France and Italy) usually contribute to a fragmented society where the media is only credible to individuals who share a similar ideology (Almond, 1960). In Mexico the situation is somewhat different. Many of Mexico's current media institutions, particularly newspapers, arose in the same year as the revolution and were committed to the same goals as the P.R.I. The P.R.I. has traditionally allowed freedom of expression under its umbrella and primarily relies on economic or political sanctions for those who stray to far from the party (Johnson, 1972). Thus, the media in Mexico are often critical of lower echelon officials and some domestic problems, but they are rarely critical of the president or of the government's foreign policy, except insofar as they exhibit consistently bitter

criticism of the United States. Their close association with the P.R.I. and recognition of the limits of their expression has led some to characterize them as one of the most cooperative presses in the world which continuously practices self-censorship (Pierce, 1979).

Third, Mexico's practicing journalists do not see themselves as neutral watchdogs devoted to providing unbiased information. For example, there is almost no distinction between news and advertising. The common practice of 'gacetilla,' or the purchasing of news space for stories in any section of a paper for which journalists often serve as jobbers further distinguishes them from the Western press (Pierce, 1979). The practice of 'embute,' or a monthly gratuity paid to reporters to create a favorable image for P.R.I. politicians is another example of the differences between media in Mexico and the U.S. (Johnson, 1972; Pierce, 1979). In addition, government secrecy typically precludes a free flow of information in any case.

Fourth, while Mexico's political elites prefer to use the informal means of persuasion cited above and the existing values of the media elite, there is also a high degree of state control over the media. The state control most often used involves economically rewarding friends and punishing enemies, rather than more coercive tactics. State owned enterprises represent one-half of Mexico's economy and constitute a considerable source of advertising revenue. More importantly, the major source of newsprint at affordable prices in Mexico is PIPSA, a government controlled consortium. PIPSA provides access, loans, and cut rates to cooperative media. Noncooperative newspapers and magazines are denied access or find their debts suddenly called in. More formal controls also exist: a government agency licenses newspapers, and the constitution and federal laws provide for suppression of media that are threats to the state (Pierce 1979).

Communication Channels in Mexico

In many ways, the media in Mexico serve as an extension of the political elite, often providing a vehicle for transmitting the party line of the P.R.I. This is the role of mass media in many developing societies. Political development has been seen as a process of national integration (Fagen, 1966) primarily through the development of more open and sophisticated channels of communication (Galnoor, 1980). Chaffee and Izcaray (1975) argue that the correlation of different subgroupings in response to the larger global environment is one of the three central functions of the media in a developing society. Thus the media in a developing society, like Mexico, can be seen primarily as a vehicle for transmitting information among elites, thus serving a consensus building process (Deutsch, 1953; Fagen, 1966; Galnoor, 1980).

However, the remaining parts of society, and the elites themselves, can become distrustful of the media in this situation. In fact, in Mexico the media are not viewed as credible and are held in widespread disdain by the rest of society (Pierce, 1979). In a dependency framework, this would reduce the audience's reliance on the media for information. However, a dependency model only focuses on mass media channels as sources of information, ignoring the existence of other well organized and routinized channels of communication inherent in a nation's political structure.

Galnoor (1980) has identified three major channels of political information: the media, the bureaucracy, and political parties. In Mexico, because of the central role of the P.R.I., the bureaucracy and political parties have typically acted as feedback mechanisms to detect problems in the larger society. In turn, they influence members of the society, largely through a spoils system reminiscent of early American city political machines, to adopt the perspectives

of the P.R.I. (Johnson, 1972). In developing societies, at least until the media can develop a distinct role, these channels may be the most influential in determining the cognitions of individuals. Not only are these channels personal and direct, but they also (at least in Mexico) determine what is transmitted via mass media channels.

A major shortcoming, then, in translating dependency models to Mexico is its lack of specification of the linkage between political elites and the media which constrain media messages. Another is its lack of recognition of other channels of communication which are regular and routine but not characterized by their technologies.

Hypotheses

The present study has several unique features that permit an assessment of how well the dependency model generalizes to the role of mass media in Mexico. First, two different data sets, one from 1976 and the other from 1979, are used to determine the correspondence between perceptions of mass media elites and other social groupings. Over-time designs are desirable for assessment of the cognitive effects of the media, since the media typically give greater coverage to events prior to their actual peak and there is a temporal gap between media presentations and effects (Becker et. al, 1975). The timing of these studies is important since in 1976 Mexicans were just becoming aware of the extent of their oil reserves; by 1979 the country had adopted an entirely new economic development plan (Flanigan, 1979).

This study also looks at functionally distinct groupings within Mexican society. As Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) have noted, it is likely that cognitions of distinct groups are likely to differ systematically. This is especially true of elites who differ from other segements of society because

of their distinct symbol system which grows out of socialization patterns associated with schooling, class values, and a network of continual communication patterns with other elites (Arora & Lasswell, 1969) and as a result of their functional roles (Tims and Johnson, 1980). Data for this study were gathered from four different groupings: mass media elites, occupational elites, occupational elites, upper SES urban elites in 1976, and the general public and upper urban populations in 1979.

The focus of this study is on determining the correspondence between the perceptual dimensions these groups use to structure information. For a complex issue, such as relationships with foreign countries, individuals form multidimensional perceptions of the world. An examination of the fit between mass media perceptions and the perceptions of other groups provides a more complete and rich description of media effects, especially when the dependency model suggests that the media can determine perceptions of social reality, expand belief systems, and determine the relative salience of various issues.

The development of a comprehensive theory in any field depends on the identification of increasingly specific limiting conditions on relationships between the variables of interest. The dependency model specifies two conditions that determine media effects in any society: one, dependency on mass media channels for information and two, the rate of change and conflict. The groups examined in this research are differentially dependent on the mass media. The occupational elites have various contacts outside of Mexico which can serve as alternative sources of information. For example, business elites have recurring commercial ties with other countries that can serve as alternative sources of information in developing their perspectives (Ross, 1971). Upper SES groups similarly have more alternative sources of information than the general populace. The groups in this study can be ordered in terms of their

dependence on media for information from the general populace, to upper SES, to the occupational elites. In addition, the rate of social change considerably accelerated from 1976 to 1979. This tied with the temporal latency of media effects should, if the dependency model is correct, result in a greater correspondence between the media and the other groups in 1979 than in 1976.

HYPOTHESIS A1: In 1976 the perspectives of the urban upper SES group should be more similar to the mass media than those of the occupational elites.

HYPOTHESIS A2: In 1979 the perceptions of the general populace will be more similar to the mass media than those of the urban upper SES.

HYPOTHESIS A3: In 1979 the perceptions of the urban upper SES will be more similar to the mass media than to their own perceptions in 1976.

These hypotheses follow from direct application of dependency models to Mexico. However, other studies have found that models of mass communication developed in the industrialized West have only limited applicability to a media rich developing society similar to Mexico (Chaffee and Izcaray, 1975). The major difference between the media in Mexico and the West is their lack of a functionally distinct role, assumed in the dependency model, and the high level of constraint exercised on them by other elements in the society. It was developed in detail earlier that the media in Mexico may in essence, in their public expressions, mirror the views of the P.R.I. and the government, rather than their own perspectives.

In addition, transborder data flows further constrain the ability of the media to present programming reflecting their own views. For example, a substantial amount of Mexican television programming comes from the United States (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1973). In fact, the media's role in surveilling

the larger global environment and their gatekeeping function may serve to differentiate their perspectives from other groups, since they possess information that they may be incapable of transmitting to the rest of society.

Another factor in the Mexican situation not explicated in the dependency model is the presence of alternative routine channels of political communication, specifically the bureaucracy and the P.R.I. Given the low degree of media credibility and the direct tie of these channels to authoritative sources, economic benefits, and political power, it is not unreasonable to expect that social grouping in Mexico may become more dependent on them than on the media. Given this rationale, it could be alternatively hypothesized that it is the occupational elites and not the mass media who possess the central influence in a developing society faced with the conditions of social change and conflict specified by the dependency model. This leads to three alternative hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS B1: In 1976 the perspectives of the urban upper SES group should be more similar to the occupational elites than to those of mass media elites.

HYPOTHESIS B2: In 1979 the perceptions of the general populace will be more similar to the occupational elites than to those of the urban upper SES.

HYPOTHESIS B3: In 1979 the perceptions of the urban upper SES will be more similar to the occupational elites than to their own perceptions in 1976.

DATA SOURCES AND MEASURES

Data from two separate surveys were used to address the issues examined in this paper. The first was conducted in December of 1976 and involved a purposive quota sampling of 100 elites in each of eight occupationally defined populations in the cities of Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, Mexico. The sample quotas in each of the occupational groups were drawn from exhausive lists of positions (not individuals) in the organizations and offices defined in Appendix A. For the purposes of this paper the seven non-mass media elite groups were combined to form a single occupational elite sample. In addition, this survey also included a systematic random sample of the upper SES urban public in these three cities ($\underline{n}$ = 411).

The second survey was conducted in 1979 just prior to President Carter's visit and involved a stratified random sample ($\underline{n}$ = 500) of the general public in the Federal District of Mexico City, Mexico. The upper SES public was oversampled (n=200) and weights were used to match the sample strata with population parameters (see Appendix B for details).

Both surveys, sponsored by the U.S. International Communication Agency, employed individual personal interviews and were carried out by Mexican research firms.

From these surveys five different groups were defined; three in 1976, and two in 1979. These are the mass media elites (n=100), the occupational elites (n=700), the upper SES in 1976 (n=411), the upper SES in 1979 (n=200), and the Mexico City general public in 1979 (n=500).

Measures

A common set of items assessing perceptions of Mexico's shared economic interests with 10 different partners was used in each survey. The partners asked about include: Brazil, the United States, Venezuela, Cuba, the Soviet

Union, Latin American oil exporting countries, Arab oil exporting countries, third world countries, European Economic Community countries, and Central American countries. The question text for these items is:

> Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?

OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS DESIGN

The purpose of the analysis in this paper is to (1) determine the nature of the underlying structure of the perceptions about Mexico's shared economic interests in each of the five study groups and to (2) systematically compare the structures identified. To do this requires three distinct stages of data analysis. The first stage involves determining the item by item relationships for each of the ten measures in each of the five data sets. This is accomplished by computing pearson product-moment correlations for the measures in each data set. The second stage involves actually determining the nature of the underlying perceptual dimensions characterizing each data set. This is accomplished by using the correlation matrices in principle components analysis. This technique will reduce the original correlational data into an n dimensional set of components, or factors, representing the underlying structure in the data set. The third stage involves making systematic factor by factor comparisons of the structures identified in each of the data sets. This third procedure is accomplished by using a little known statistic developed by Burt (1948) and Tucker (1951) known as the coefficient of congruence. Since this technique is not widely known a brief description is in order.

The Coefficient of Congruence

Harman (1975) describes this technique as a straightforward method for making systematic determinations of the "similarity" of factor patterns which

are based on a common set of variables. This technique can be used to compare different samples from the same population, samples from different populations, or samples over time. The coefficient, known by the small Greek letter phi (Φ), is similar to the well-known product-moment correlation coefficient in its formula and in that it ranges from a value of +1, indicating total congruence, to -1, indicating total inverse congruence, with the value 0 indicating no congruence at all. It, however, is not a correlation coefficient. In discussing the formula shown in Equation 1 Harman (1975) points out that ". . . the a's are not deviates from their respective means and the summations are over the n variables instead of the number of individuals." (p. 270)

(1)
$$\text{phi} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} {}_1a_{jp} \cdot {}_2a_{jq}}{\sqrt{\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} {}_1a^2_{jp}\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} {}_2a^2_{jq}\right)}}$$

where:

a is the factor pattern coefficient
p is the factor from study A
q is the factor from study B
n is the number of variables

Also discussed by Harman is the fact that no actual test of significance has been developed for this coefficient, although he does cite the criteria used in several research studies. In the absence of a systematic standard such as a significance test we have opted for using a conservative standard cut-off point. Coefficients at or above .80 will be considered congruent, while those above .90 will be considered highly congruent. These standards are basically in line with those used by other researchers cited by Harman.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Perceptions of Shared Economic Interests

Perceptions of Mexico's shared interests with the 10 potential economic partners asked about are shown in Table 1 for each of the five samples. The 10 economic partners are rank ordered so that the economic partner perceived as having economic interests most in line with those of Mexico is first and so on. It is clear that the strongest economic identification is with the Latin American oil exporting countries. This is particularly true for upper SES and occupationally defined samples. This is generally followed by an orientation toward Central American and third world countries which, of course, is in keeping with Mexico's recent past. The United States occupies approximately equivalent status with Brazil in the perceptions of Mexico's economic linkages. This is somewhat surprising since the United States is by far and away Mexico's principle trading partner. Such a pattern would suggest that Mexican's do not necessarily see the economic interests of the United States and those of Mexico as always corresponding.

Next in the rank ordering a certain amount of inconsistency across the five samples is readily apparent in terms of perceptions of shared economic interests partners such as Arab oil exporting countries, European Community countries, and Cuba. Finally, the Soviet Union is seen as having the least in common with Mexico's economic interests.

The Structure of Shared Interests Perceptions

Although of considerable interest, the major objective of this paper is not to describe or compare the relative positions of various partners in terms of their average level of perceived economic shared interests with Mexico. The major objective in this paper is to identify how various segments of Mexican society structure their views of Mexico's economic linkages and to systematically compare these structures. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the pearson product-moment correlations, means, standard deviations and unweighted n's for each of the five data sets under study. These tables show, for example, that the perceptions of shared economic interests with the Soviet Union and with Cuba are highly similar. In like fashion, so are perceptions of shared interests with the Central American countries and third world countries.

These patterns of correlations suggest that perceptions of Mexico's economic ties may very well be characterized by a basic set of underlying dimensions. A systematic identification of the basic patterns existing in these data sets was obtained through a principle components analysis using a varimax orthogonal rotation. Only factors having eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were retained. The results from these analyses are presented in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In each of the tables the variables are ordered to reflect the ordering of the individual variables on the factors.

The results for the mass media elites are shown in Table 5. A total of four factors were identified with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The first factor is principally defined by perceptions of shared economic interests with third world countries, Central American countries, and Brazil. These are all non-oil resource based nations and seem to define Mexico's traditional economic identifications. The second factor is defined by perceptions of shared economic interests with the United States, European Community nations,

and the Arab oil exporting countries. These partners are all major economic powers outside of Mexico's social or cultural traditions. The third factor is defined by Latin American oil exporting countries and Venezuela. The linkage here is quite straitforward since Venezuela represents one of the major oil exporters in Latin America. Finally, the fourth factor is defined by the communist countries of Cuba and the Soviet Union. In sum, this analysis demonstrates that to a very large degree Mexico's mass media's perceptions of shared economic interests are defined by four basic orientations.

The principle components analyses for the other data sets examined also revealed four basic underlying dimensions, although the relative amount of factor variance explained by the factors identified varies considerably between data sets. Several commonalities in the principle components across the samples are noteworthy. In four of the five analyses the Soviet Union and Cuba defined a unique factor. Only for the general populace in 1979 was this dimension different. For this segment of Mexican society the Soviet Union, Cuba, the United States, and the European Community nations loaded together on the same factor. Consistent across all five of the data sets was the common loading of Central American countries and third world countries. The consistent emergence of four basic dimensions in each analysis suggests that Mexican perceptions of economic linkages are: (1) multidimensional and (2) somewhat consistent across time and across social strata within the society.

Nevertheless, there is clear evidence from these factor solutions that differences do exist in the structure of perceptions about Mexico's economic linkages. A prime example of this is how perceptions of shared economic interests with Arab oil exporting countries loads in the different data sets.

In the mass media and 1976 urban upper SES samples the Arab oil countries load on the same factor with third world and Latin American oil exporting countries. In the 1979 Mexico City general populace, the Arab and Latin American oil exporting countries define a factor by themselves, and for the upper SES samples in 1979 and 1976 the Arab oil exporting countries are found to load on the same factor as the United States.

Obviously, a systematic and meaningful comparison of the factor structures from five different data sets is quite difficult if attacked by attempting to compare individual item factor loadings. This is especially true when specific hypotheses are to be tested. Therefore, a single coefficient indicating the similarity, or congruence, of factors from different samples was used.

Coefficients of Congruence

Table 10 presents all of the non-redundant coefficients of congruence for each of the factors identified in the five principle components analyses. Each block of coefficients in the table represents all of the comparisons for a pairing of the factor patterns from two data sets. For example, the comparison of factor 1 from the mass media elites data set and factor 1 from the upper SES data set from 1976 is represented by a coefficient of congruence of .80. By the standards accepted for this paper this coefficient indicates that these two factors are 'essentially' congruent. Further inspection of the first row of the first column clearly shows that they are much more congruent than any other pariing of these two factors in these factor solutions.

Hypothesis A 1

This hypothesis predicts that the urban upper SES group in 1976 will be more similar to the mass media elites than will the occupational elites careful inspection of Table 10 provides no support for this hypothesis. Averaging the highest coefficients of congruence in the columns and rows of the two blocks shows that the average maximum coefficeint of congruence between the mass media elites and the upper SES group is .81 and the average coefficient of congruence between the mass media elites and the occupational elites is also .81. Overall, there is no difference in the congruence of the structure of the perceptions of these two groups with the mass media elites, although the factors are somewhat differently defined.

Hypothesis A 2

This hypothesis predicts that the perceptions of the general populace in 1979 will be more similar to the mass media than those of the urban upper SES in 1979. Inspection of Table 10 does not support this hypothesis. In fact, there is some evidence that the reverse is true. The average maximum coefficients for the mass media-1979 upper SES comparison is .81 while the mass media comparison with the general populace sample is .76.

Hypothesis A 3

Hypothesis A 3 predicts that the perceptions of the urban upper SES public in 1979 will be more similar to the mass media than to the urban upper SES perceptions in 1976. Based on the average coefficients this hypothesis is not supported. The average maximum coefficeint of congruence for the mass media-upper SES in 1979 comparison is .76 while the 1976-1979 upper SES average is .82. Again, if anything, the results contradict the predicted relationship.

Hypothesis B 1

This hypothesis states that the perspectives of urban upper SES in 1976 should be more similar to the occupational elites than to those of the mass media elites. This hypothesis is strongly supported in Table 10. The average maximum coefficients for the mass media-upper SES comparison is .82 while the upper SES-occupational elite average maximum congruence in .97.

Hypothesis B 2

This hypothesis states that the perceptions of the general populace will be more similar to the occupational elites than to those of the urban upper SES in 1979. Comparison of the 1979 general populace factor structure with that of the upper SES in 1976 and the occupational elite in 1976 reveals no systematic differences in the overall structure. Again using the average maximum coefficient for the group comparisons as an indicator it was found that both 1976 groups have average factor congruences of .82 with the 1979 general populace. Hypotheses B 2 is not supported.

Hypothesis B 3

This hypothesis predicts that the perceptions of the urban upper SES in 1979 will be more similar to the occupational elites than to their own perceptions in 1976. This hypothesis is not supported by the evidence shown in Table 10. The average maximum coefficients for the upper SES 1976-upper SES 1979 comparison is .81 while the occupational elite-upper SES 1979 comparison is .76.

IMPLICATIONS

Taken as a whole the results suggest that the constraints on the mass media that exist in Mexican society and the presence of other recurring channels for political communication give the occupational elites in Mexico the central position of influence. This suggests that current dependency model formulations need to be modified to reflect other recurring and habitual channels of communication that serve centralized information processing functions, such as the bureaucracy and political parties. In societies where political elites can exercise considerable influence over the mass media, thus depriving them of their functionally distinct role, mass media influence may then be supplanted by other channels.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the reported findings is the high degree of structural similarity observed across socio-economic strata and over a three year time span. This may be partly a reflection of the nature of Mexican society, which for 70 years has been governed by a unique political party promoting consensus within the society. This pattern is also generally reflected in the rank ordered means shown in Table 1. The area of greatest volatility is clearly in the perceptions of Mexico's shared economic interests with the Arab oil exporting countries. Some indication of the changing structure is reflected in the fact that in 1976 the urban upper SES factor structure grouped shared economic interests with the Arab oil exporting countries with the United States and the European Community nations. By 1979 this had changed dramatically. The Arab oil economic similarity measure was the strongest loading item on a factor also defined by Latin oil and the United States. This shift is particularly significant given the rapidly changing economic status of Mexico. The Latin

oil producing country interests are no longer grouped with the Central American and third world economic shared interests for the urban upper SES in Mexico. These interests changed from a third world poor nation linkage to a first world rich nation linkage. Moreover, as shown by the ranked means, Mexico's strongest economic identification is with Latin American oil exporting countries. In other words, Mexican upper SES elites appear to be modifying their basic perceptions of Mexico's economic interests. In addition, when all of the groups are compared the media are the most divergent in their attitude structures, which probably reflects their unique position at the cross roads of information coming from outside of Mexico. These results taken in total reveal the richness of the analysis utilized here over a characteristically unidimensional approach, primarily related to salience, for examination of the effects of mass media channels of communication on attitude formation within a society (e.g. Becker et al., 1975).

The fact that only hypothesis B1 received support may be attributable to several factors. One explanation for the findings is the non equivalence of the samples used in 1976 and 1979. However, the high degree of factor congruence over time tends to argue against this methodological explanation. Another methodological problem exists in the temporal lag between the two studies. Research in the United States has suggested that a one and one-half year period may be best for assessing the cognitive effects of the media (Becker, et al., 1975). Thus it is possible that the mass media, and for that matter the occupational elites, may have shifted their positions and their resulting effects during this time.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 may not have received support because, while there was increasing change in this period, there were not dramatic indications of societal conflict. However, the dramatic decline in the similarity between occupational elites and the urban SES group from 1976 to 1979 may be an indication that Mexico's traditionally unified society is starting to fragment in their perceptions, which may result in the more dramatic types of conflict, exhibited in societies with less stable social systems, in similar periods of change.

In sum, this paper has attempted a systematic and comprehensive study of the structure of Mexican perceptions of shared economic interests with other nations. More specifically, it has attempted to systematically examine the structure of these perceptions in terms of framework developed in Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur's dependency theory. The results were not supportive of the role specified for the mass media in attitude formation predicted in the dependency model. In fact, there is much stronger evidence for the central influence on attitude formation resting with the occupational elites. These elites, in Mexico, control bureaucratic and political party channels that serve centralized information functions which are apparently related to the structure of attitudes held by other groups. Indeed the basic dependency argument may be correct, and its failure in this research may reflect a need to include all the regular and routine channels of communication in their framework. What appears to be needed is a more broadly conceived dependency framework which can include all the recurring channels of intergroup, or extrasystem, communication within a society.

REFERENCES

ALMOND, G.A. Introduction: A functional approach to comparative politics. In G.A. Almond & J.S. Coleman (Eds.) The politics of developing areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 3-64.

ALMOND, G.A., & VERBA,S.V. The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963.

BALL-ROKEACH, S.J., & DeFLEUR, M.L. A dependency model of mass media effects. Communication Research, 1976, 3, 3-21.

BECKER, L.B., McCOMBS, M.E., & McLEOD, J.M. The development of political cognitions. In Chaffee , S.H. (Ed.) Political communication: Issues and strategies for research. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975, pp. 21-63.

BLUMLER, J.G., & GUREVITCH, M. Towards a comparative framework for political communication research. In Chaffee, S.H. (Ed.) Political communication: Issues and strategies for research. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975, pp. 165-194.

BURT, C. The factorial study of temperamental traits. British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section. 1948, 1, 178-203.

CHAFFEE, S.H. The diffussion of political information. In S.H. Chaffee (Ed.) Political communication: Issues and strategies for research. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975, pp.85-128.

CHAFFEE, S.H., & IZCARAY, F. Mass communication functions in a media rich developing society. Communication Research. 1975, 2, 367-395.

DEUTSCH, K.W. Social mobilization and political development. American Political Science Review. 1961, 55, 493-514.

FAGEN, R.R. Politics and communication. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.

HARMAN, H.H. Modern factor analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

HOROWITZ, I.L. Three worlds of development: The theory and practise of international stratification. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

FLANIGAN, J. Mexico's drive to industrialize: The strategy. Forbes. October 29, 1979.

GALNOOR, I. Political communication and the study of politics. In D. Nimmo (Ed.) Communication Yearbook 4. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980, pp. 99-112.

JOHNSON, K.F. Mexican democracy: A critical view. Boston: Allyn Bacon, 1972.

MILLARD, W.J. Mexico City public opinion prior to the Presidential Visit. Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Communication Agency, Report R-10-79, 1979.

NORDENSTRENG, K., & VARIS, T. The nonhomogeneity of the national state and the international flow of communication. In G. Gerbner, L.P. Gross, & W.H. Melody (Eds.) Communications technology and social policy: Understanding the new 'cultural revolution'. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

PIERCE, R.N. Keeping the flame: Media and government in Latin America, New York: Hastings House, 1979.

ROSS, J.B. The economic system of Mexico. Stanford: California Institute of International Studies, 1971.

TIMS, A.R., & JOHNSON, J.D. The international politics of Mexican economic development: The views of strategic elites in Mexico. Paper presented to the International Communication Association Annual Convention, Acapulco, Mexico, 1980.

TUCKER, L.R. A method for synthesis of factor analysis studies. Personnel Research Section report, No.984. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1951.

Table 1. Rank Ordered Means for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Economic Interests with Mexico Based on the Urban Samples in 1976 and 1979[ab]

Mass Media Elites		Upper SES in 1976		Occupational Elites		Upper SES in 1979		General Public in 1979	
Economic Partner	Mean	Economic Partner	Mean	Economic Partner	Mean	Economic Partner	Mean	Economic Partner	Mean
Venezuela	2.00	Latin Oil	2.06	Latin Oil	2.00	Latin Oil	1.96	Central Am.	2.09
Latin Oil	2.15	Central Am.	2.17	Venezuela	2.05	Venezuela	2.07	Latin Oil	2.09
Third Wld.	2.20	Third Wld.	2.23	Central Am.	2.07	Central Am.	2.18	Venezuela	2.19
Central Am.	2.27	Venezuela	2.29	Third Wld.	2.13	Third Wld.	2.19	Third Wld.	2.21
Brazil	2.44	Brazil	2.48	Brazil	2.42	Brazil	2.20	USA	2.27
USA	2.45	USA	2.67	USA	2.70	USA	2.30	Brazil	2.31
Arab Oil	2.91	Arab Oil	2.99	Arab Oil	2.93	Arab Oil	2.66	EEC	2.60
Cuba	2.95	EEC	3.00	Cuba	3.04	EEC	2.71	Arab Oil	2.71
EEC	3.16	Cuba	3.18	EEC	3.06	Cuba	3.04	Cuba	3.07
USSR	3.45	USSR	3.52	USSR	3.47	USSR	3.35	USSR	3.32

[a]Question wording and codes: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (county) are (1) very much in agreement, (2) fairly well in agreement, (3) rather different, or (4) very different?

[b]See methods section for a description of the samples.

Table 2. Correlations[a] Between Measures of Shared Interests with Mexico for 10 Economic Partners in the Urban Sample of Occupational[b] Elites and the Sample of Mass Media Elites in Mexico in 1976

Measure[d]	Correlations[c] (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	Occup. Elites Mean	S.D.	n[e]
(1) Brazil	---	.21	.23	.07	.10	.15	.16	.09	.09	.14	2.42	.87	657
(2) United States	.24	---	.18	.10	.24	.13	.19	.06	.31	.15	2.70	1.13	684
(3) Venezuela	.16	.21	---	.18	.16	.28	.20	.20	.02	.17	2.05	.77	650
(4) Cuba	.15	.11	.17	---	.52	.13	.17	.18	.19	.17	3.04	.89	660
(5) Soviet Union	.13	.34	-.07	.44	---	.16	.24	.14	.27	.15	3.47	.73	651
(6) Latin Oil Prod.	.10	.17	.24	.11	-.02	---	.48	.32	.19	.23	2.00	.86	684
(7) Arab Oil Prod.	.17	.36	.21	.09	.22	.37	---	.28	.39	.26	2.93	.99	673
(8) Third World	.31	- 01	.18	.16	-.09	.17	.13	---	.15	.27	2.13	.97	666
(9) European Comm.	.25	.40	.00	.06	.27	-.07	.36	.30	---	.25	3.07	.88	663
(10) Central America	.38	.12	.01	.16	.02	.42	.16	.39	.19	---	2.07	.77	678
Mass Media Elite Mean	2.44	2.45	2.00	2.95	3.45	2.15	2.91	2.20	3.16	2.27			
Mass Media Elite S.D.	.83	1.12	.79	.97	.78	.93	.98	.94	.87	.94			
Mass Media Elite n[e]	93	94	95	95	95	93	92	93	92	95			

[a]Figures above the diagonal and to the right are for the urban sample of occupational elites in Mexico in 1976. Figures below the diagonal are for the urban sample of mass media elites in Mexico in 1976.

[b]See methods section for a description of the occupational groups.

[c]Computed using pair-wise deletion of missing data.

[d]Question wording and codes: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are (1) very much in agreement, (2) fairly well in agreement, (3) rather different, or (4) very different?

[e]Missing values excluded.

Table 1 Correlations[a] Between Measures of Shared Interests with Mexico for 10 Economic Partners in the Urban Sample of the Upper SES Public in Mexico in 1976 and the Mexico City Sample of the Upper SES Public in 1979

Measure[c]	Correlations[b] (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	Upper SES in 1976 Mean	S.D.	n[d]
(1) Brazil	---	.26	.29	.14	.09	.24	.09	.06	.11	.09	2.48	.80	366
(2) United States	.06	---	.14	.10	.15	.13	.29	.04	.28	.24	2.67	1.10	405
(3) Venezuela	.30	.04	---	.14	.08	.09	.08	.15	.01	.13	2.29	.73	363
(4) Cuba	.23	.04	.32	---	.47	.15	.23	.08	.16	.16	3.18	.85	381
(5) Soviet Union	.18	.24	.12	.62	---	.11	.23	.02	.28	.12	3.52	.69	372
(6) Latin Oil Prod.	.08	.25	.20	.12	.15	---	.33	.30	.19	.32	2.06	.81	387
(7) Arab Oil Prod.	.09	.18	.02	.19	.14	.35	---	.19	.41	.24	2.99	.94	366
(8) Third World	.07	.08	.11	.21	.14	.34	.17	---	.07	.33	2.23	.92	367
(9) European Comm.	-.02	.31	-.13	-.05	.11	.03	.28	.05	---	.27	3.00	.91	357
(10) Central America	.17	.12	.17	.15	.15	.24	.03	.44	.17	---	2.17	.78	391
Upper SES in 1979 Mean	2.24	2.30	2.07	3.11	3.45	1.97	2.59	2.17	2.77	2.28			
Upper SES in 1979 S.D.	.95	1.10	.86	1.01	.84	1.02	1.13	1.09	1.01	1.04			
Upper SES in 1979 n[d]	155	166	147	162	156	161	164	151	154	160			

[a]Figures above the diagonal and to the right are for the urban sample of the upper SES public in Mexico in 1976. Figures below the diagonal are for the Mexico City sample of the upper SES public in 1979.

[b]Computed using pair-wise deletion of missing data.

[c]Question wording and codes: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are (1) very much in agreement, (2) fairly well in agreement, (3) rather different, or (4) very different?

[d]Missing values excluded.

Table 4. Correlations between Measures of Shared Interest with Mexico for 10 Economic Partners Based on a Mexico City Sample of the General Public in 1979

Measure[b]	Correlations[a]									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) Brazil	---									
(2) United States	.09	---								
(3) Venezuela	.37	.19	---							
(4) Cuba	.23	.18	.27	---						
(5) Soviet Union	.01	.25	-.01	.53	---					
(6) Latin Oil Prod.	.19	.18	.15	.08	.08	---				
(7) Arab Oil Prod.	-.04	.13	-.04	.18	.21	.27	---			
(8) Third World	.10	.06	.10	.05	.07	.30	.16	---		
(9) European Comm.	.00	.26	-.02	.10	.23	.05	.20	.12	---	
(10) Central America	.14	.14	.14	.14	.19	.17	.03	.38	.22	---
Mean	2.31	2.27	2.19	3.07	3.32	2.09	2.71	2.21	2.60	2.09
S.D.	.88	1.13	.90	1.00	.97	1.00	1.09	1.06	1.06	.92
n[c]	441	477	427	449	430	457	442	416	443	447

[a]Computed using pair-wise deletion of missing data. Based on wieghted data.

[b]Question wording and codes: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are (1) very much in agreement, (2) fairly well in agreement, (3) rather different, or (4) very different?

[c]Missing values excluded. Unweighted n's.

Table 5. Factor Loadings from a Principle Components Analysis Using a Varimax Rotation for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Economic Interests with Mexico Based on an Urban Sample of Mass Media Elites in Mexico in 1976

Measure[a]	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Third World	.80*	.01	.07	-.05
Central America	.76*	.02	.23	.06
Brazil	.63*	.25	.02	.14
United States	-.02	.77*	.21	.17
European Community	.37	.75*	-.27	.01
Arab Oil Producers	.08	.66*	.45	.01
Latin Oil Producers	.23	.04	.80*	.00
Venezuela	.03	.10	.67*	.05
Cuba	.19	-.09	.16	.88*
Soviet Union	-.08	.41	-.13	.78*
Eigenvalue	1.84	1.83	1.50	1.42
Percent of Variance	18.4%	18.3%	15.0%	14.2%

[a]Question wording: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?

Table 6. Factor Loadings from a Principle Components Analysis Using A Varimax Rotation for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Economic Interests with Mexico Based on an Urban Sample of the Upper SES Public in Mexico in 1976

Measure[a]	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Third World	.82*	-.12	.01	.05
Latin Oil Producers	.65*	.22	.07	.15
Central America	.65*	.30	.05	.05
European Community	.13	.75*	.20	-.10
United States	-.02	.71*	-.06	.38
Arab Oil Producers	.35	.62*	.22	-.05
Cuba	.12	.03	.84*	.13
Soviet Union	-.02	.22	.82*	.02
Brazil	.04	.19	.02	.79*
Venezuela	.17	-.12	.13	.75*
Eigenvalue	2.67	1.31	1.20	1.07
Percent of Variance	26.7%	13.1%	12.0%	10.7%

[a]Question wording: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?

*Indicates variables loading on factor.

Table 7. Factor Loadings from a Principle Components Analysis Using a Varimax Rotation for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Economic Interests with Mexico Based on an Urban Sample of Occupational Elites[a] in Mexico in 1976

Measure[b]	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Latin Oil Producers	.74*	.00	.05	.19
Third World	.70*	.15	-.15	.04
Arab Oil Producers	.68*	.07	.37	.04
Central America	.52*	.10	.21	.08
Cuba	.13	.88*	.00	.05
Soviet Union	.09	.82*	.25	.07
European Community	.31	.17	.76*	-.17
United States	-.03	.10	.71*	.36
Brazil	.05	-.03	.21	.76*
Venezuela	.30	.19	-.16	.70*
Eigenvalue	2.84	1.25	1.09	1.08
Percent of Variance	28.4%	12.5%	10.9%	10.8%

[a]This sample is made up of Mexicans in the following occupational groups: university professors, business executives in Mexican owned firms, business executives in U.S. owned firms, university students, labor leaders, secondary school teachers, and Mexican government officials.

[b]Question wording: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?

*Indicates variables loading on factor.

Table 8. Factor Loadings from a Principle Components Analysis Using a Varimax Rotation for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Interests with Mexico Based on a Mexico City Sample of the Upper SES Public in 1979

Measure[a]	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Soviet Union	.87*	.10	.07	-.08
Cuba	.83*	.05	.10	.25
Arab Oil Producers	.09	.80*	-.04	-.02
Latin Oil Producers	-.06	.70*	.34	.30
United States	.23	.53*	.08	-.34
Central America	.14	-.01	.86*	-.04
Third World	.05	.16	.79*	.08
European Community	.14	.37	.14	-.68*
Venezuela	.26	.14	.13	.67*
Brazil	.36	.11	.09	.41*
Eigenvalue	2.53	1.53	1.24	1.00
Percent of Variance	25.3%	15.3%	12.4%	10.0%

[a]Question wording: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very much different?

*Indicates variables loading on factor.

Table 9. Factor Loadings from a Principle Components Analysis Using A Varimax Rotation for 10 Measures of Perceived Shared Economic Interests with Mexico Based on a Mexico City Sample of the General Public in 1979

Measure[a]	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Soviet Union	.83*	-.07	.06	.06
Cuba	.75*	.35	-.11	.06
United States	.48*	.13	.20	.11
European Community	.45*	-.28	.48	.00
Venezuela	.12	.79*	.07	-.01
Brazil	.06	.76*	.07	.06
Central America	.16	.14	.81*	-.05
Third World	-.09	.11	.68*	.38
Arab Oil Producers	.31	-.22	-.06	.76*
Latin Oil Producers	-.03	.26	.21	.75*
Eigenvalue	2.40	1.44	1.32	1.03
Percent of Variance	24.0%	14.4%	13.2%	10.3%

[a]Question wording: Whatever your opinion of (country), do you think the basic economic interests of Mexico and those of (country) are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?

*Indicates variables loading on factor .

Table 10. Coefficients of Congruence for the Factors Identified Using Principle Components Analysis for the Urban Samples in 1976 and 1979[ab]

		Mass Media Elites				Upper SES in 1976				Occupational Elites				Upper SES in 1979			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Upper SES 1976	1	.80*	.21	.61	.07												
	2	.34	.93*	.22	.24												
	3	.16	.32	.14	.94*												
	4	.38	.29	.52	.24												
Occup. Elites	1	.70	.40	.69	.12	.94*	.47	.30	.23								
	2	.20	.31	.13	.96*	.22	.27	.97*	.19								
	3	.28	.93*	.03	.26	.16	.97*	.26	.18								
	4	.37	.31	.57	.22	.23	.20	.13	.99*								
Upper SES 1979	1	.28	.42	.15	.96*	.16	.35	.92*	.44	.24	.94*	.36	.42				
	2	.32	.76	.66	.16	.56	.79	.26	.30	.75	.22	.65	.35				
	3	.88*	.13	.38	.13	.90*	.24	.16	.23	.76	.26	.16	.24				
	4	.12	-.42	.59	.12	.20	-.48	.10	.61	.18	.09	-.58	.63				
General Public 1979	1	.18	.66	.13	.88*	.15	.64	.88*	.24	.29	.89*	.64	.23	.90*	.45	.18	-.17
	2	.42	-.02	.56	.28	.27	-.07	.18	.93*	.24	.23	-.10	.91*	.42	.13	.31	.80*
	3	.85*	.34	.21	.01	.80*	.44	.06	.16	.69	.16	.40	.17	.15	.33	.93*	-.18
	4	.35	.41	.70	.08	.69	.45	.22	.14	.82*	.15	.26	.21	.12	.87*	.35	.18

[a]The coefficient of congruence (φ) ranges from +1 (total congruence) to -1 (total inverse congruence), with a value of 0 indicating no congruence. The coefficient indicates the similarity of two factors based on a common set of variables in different samples or across time.

[b]See methods section for a description of the samples.

* Indicates coefficients of congruence at, or above, .80. Factors having coefficients above this level are considered congruent.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF SAMPLE QUOTAS IN THE 1976 SURVEY

Listed below are the operational definitions of the audiences which guided the sample selection process.

Business executives employed by Mexican companies. All Mexican nationals who hold positions of high responsibility, such as directors, presidents, general managers, and department heads reporting to president or general manager, in medium or large firms which are wholly-owned by Mexican investors or proprietors; including but not limited to firms which are members of the Confederacion de Camaras Industriales, CONACINTA, CONCANACO, and the Union Social de Empresarios Mexicanos (excluding foreign firms which may also be members).

Business executives employed by U.S. companies. All Mexican nationals who hold positions of high responsibility, such as directors, presidents, general managers, and department heads reporting to president or general manager, in medium or large firms which are affiliates or subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which are owned substantially by U.S. investors; including but not limited to firms which are members of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, A.C., and the American Chambers of Commerce in Guadalajara and Monterrey.

Media leaders. Publishers, directors, editors, and senior journalists specializing in political, economic, and social affairs on major newspapers and magazines, including but not limited to Excelsior, Novedades, El Sol de Mexico, Ovaciones, La Prensa, El Dia, El Nacional, El Universal, El Heraldo, Avance, El Informador, El Occidental, and El Diario.

Owners, directors, producers, and program managers of major radio and TV networks and stations, and news writers, announcers, and commentators of public affairs programs; including but not limited to XEVIP, Nucleo Radio Mil, Org. Radio Centro, XEX, XEW, Grupo Acir, Ravisa, XERED, Radio Formula, Radio Universidad, XELA, Canal 2, Canal 4, Canal 5, Canal 8, Canal 12; Radio Guadalajara, Radio Comerciales, Canal 4, Canal 6.

Directors, editors, and writers in major press agencies and news services such as NOTIMEX and INFORMEX.

Members of journalist associations such as Club Primera Plana, Club de Corresponsales de Prensa, Associacion Mex. de Periodistas de Radio y TV, Associacion Nac. de Periodistas.

Government officials. Top-level and middle-level executives and administrators (from head of department through sub-secretary) in the following ministries and organizations, and others with similar functions: Presidencia, Relaciones Exteriores, Gobernacion, Hacienda y Credito Publico, Industria y Comercio, Patrimonio Nacional, Turismo, Defensa, Relaciones Publicas, Petroleos Mexicanos, Banco de Mexico, Nacional Financiera, Banco Nac. de Comercio Exterior, Plan LERMA, Consejo Nac. de Ciencia y Technologia, Instituto Mex. de Comercio Exterior.

Top-level officials in state and municipal governments in Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Federal District, and important executives of regional administrations in Guadalajara and Monterrey of the federal ministries and national institutions listed above, where applicable.

Members of the Federal Congress (Senate and Chamber of Deputies).

Directors and important department heads of the permanent staff of all political parties (PRI, PAN, PARM, PPS), including MNJR.

Labor leaders. All officers and full-time staff members at the professional level of major labor organizations in the three cities, including selected very large local unions with salaried staffs; all national unions for specific trades and industries; all regional or city labor confederations located in the three cities; and all national labor confederations.

University professors. Rectors, principal administrative department heads, deans, heads of schools and faculties, heads of academic departments, and teaching faculty members of all ranks except those who are teaching assistants (graduate students) or occasional lecturers; but only in the universities listed below for university administrators; and only in the schools or faculties listed below, within these universities for teaching faculty members. (See "University students" head for relevant lists.)

Secondary school teachers. All full-time teachers of all subjects, and all full-time principals and administrators, in all public and private schools (colegios) in the three cities which offer a preparatoria course.

University students. All matriculated students at the undergraduate and graduate levels in the following schools or faculties: Ciencias Sociales, Ciencias Politicas, Economia, Administracion Publica, Administracion de Empresas, Contaduria, Comercio, Derecho, Periodismo, Turismo, and any other schools or faculties very closely related; but only in the following Universities and Institutions: UNAM, Instituto Politecnico Nacional, El Colegio de Mexico, Instituto Panamericano de Alta Direccion de Empresa, Universidad Iberoamericana, CIDE (Centro de Investigacion y Socencia Economicas), A.C. Univ. Autonoma Metropolitana, Univ. de Guadalajara, Univ. Autonoma de Guadalajara, ITESCO, ITESM, UANL, and UDEM.

APPENDIX B

SAMPLING PROCEDURE FOR THE 1979 MEXICO CITY SAMPLE

Sampling procedures were intended to produce the following stratifications within the sample:

Strata	Sample Size	Percent of Sample	Population Estimate[a]
Upper SES	200	40%	8%
Middle SES	150	30%	36%
Lower SES	150	30%	55%

[a] Based on 1970 census

The sampling involved random probability sampling of 100 points within the Federal District, stratified by socio-economic level. The sampling frame consisted of city blocks as area units. At each sampling point a total of five interviews were conducted following a procedure involving random starting points with skip intervals between households. A random selection schedule was used to determine the respondent interviewed in each household. For additional details see Millard (1979).